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a b s t r a c t
In this study we develop a model that optimizes the price for new and remanufactured short life-cycle
products where demands are time-dependent and price sensitive. While there has been very few pub-
lished works that attempt to model remanufacturing decisions for products with short life cycle, we
believe that there are many situations where remanufacturing short life cycle products is rewarding eco-
nomically aswell as environmentally. The system thatwemodel consists of a retailer, amanufacturer, and
a collector of used product from the end customers. Two different scenarios are evaluated for the system.
The first is the independent situationwhere each party attempts tomaximize his/her own total profit and
the second is the joint profit model where we optimize the combined total profit for all three members of
the supply chain. Manufacturer acts as the Stackelberg leader in the independently optimized scenario,
while in the other the intermediate prices are determined by coordinated pricing policy. The results sug-
gest that (i) reducing the price of new products during the decline phase does not give better profit for
the whole system, (ii) the total profit obtained from optimizing each player is lower than the total profit
of the integrated model, and (iii) speed of change in demand influences the robustness of the prices as
well as the total profit gained.
© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd.
This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
Technology-based product has shorter life cycle due to rapid
innovation and development in science and technology, as well
as customer behavior in pursuing latest innovation and style. Le-
breton and Tuma [1] pointed out that technology based commodi-
ties such asmobile phones and computers have shorter innovation
cycle so that the previous generation becomes obsolete faster, ei-
ther functionally and psychologically. Similarly, Hsueh [2] also ar-
gued that product life cycle in electronic industry is shorter than
before, due to technology advances, and as a result, an outdated
product could reach its end-of-use even it is still in a good condi-
tion. Shorter life-cycle has negative contribution toward sustain-
ability, since there is an increase in product disposal. Customers
want newer products and discard the old ones, and these pref-
erences would exhaust landfill space in shorter time. In addition,
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0/).there are more natural resources and energy used to create new
products than actually needed, due to unnecessary increased ob-
solescence. Tomake it worse, electronic products are prominent as
the ones with shorter and shorter life cycle, while the wastes are
toxic and not environmentally friendly. There are many attempts
made in developed countries to control electronic wastes such as
Waste of Electric and Electronic Equipment (WEEE) directives, im-
plemented in most European countries since 2003, RoHS in United
States, 2003, and Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) issued
by OECD in 1984. However, these regulations pose as burdens to
the industries when implemented only for conformity, because
there are additional costs for handling e-wastes and increasedma-
terial cost for avoiding or minimizing toxic materials.
Several strategies have been introduced to mitigate products
disposal andwastes, such as life cycle approach, regulation and so-
ciety approach. One aspect of life cycle approach is dealing with
products at their end-of-use. According to de Brito & Dekker [3],
there are situations where customer has the opportunity to return
a product at a certain life stage, which can be referred to leasing
cases and returnable containers, and is called end-of-use return.
Hsueh [2] considered a different kind of return, where a product
maybe returnedbecause it has becomeoutdated, and the customer
le under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.
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to end-of-use products which are reprocessing, collect-and-sell,
and collect-and-dispose. Remanufacturing is one option tomanage
products at their end-of-use which offers opportunity for comply-
ing with regulation while maintaining profitability [5–7].
Remanufacturing is a process of transforming used product into
‘‘like-new’’ condition, so there is a process of recapturing the value
added to the material during manufacturing stage [8,9]. The idea
of remanufacturing used products has gained much attention re-
cently for both economic and environmental reasons. As suggested
by Gray and Charter [9], remanufacturing can reduce production
cost, the use of energy and materials.
There are numerous studies on remanufacturing. However,
most of the published works on remanufacturing have considered
durable or semi-durable products. Very little attempt has been
made to study how remanufacturing maybe applied to products
with short life cycle. In some developing countries like Indonesia,
there is a large segment of society that could become potential
market for remanufactured short-life cycle products like mobile
phones, computers and digital cameras.
In remanufacturing practice, there are three main activities,
namely product return management, remanufacturing operations,
and market development for remanufactured product [10]. In
terms of marketing strategy, there are general concerns that re-
manufactured productwould cannibalize the sales of newproduct.
However, Atasu et al. [11] concluded that remanufacturing does
not always cannibalize the sales of new products. He proposed that
managers who understand the composition of their markets, and
use the proper pricing strategy should be able to create additional
profit. Therefore, pricing decision is an important task in an effort
to gain economic benefit from remanufacturing practices.
There are several studies that focused on pricing of remanufac-
tured products, but many of them have not considered the whole
supply chain, and also only a very few concern about obsolescence
of short life cycle products. Our study will be focused on pricing
decisions in a closed loop supply chain involving manufacturer,
retailer and collector of used products (cores), where customers
have the option to purchase newor remanufactured short life cycle
products in the same market channel. We consider a monopolist
of a single item with no constraint on the quantity of remanufac-
turable cores throughout the selling horizon.
2. Literature review
Remanufacturing of mobile phones and electronic products has
been recognized as an important practice in the United States, and
as a potential in China and India. Helo [12] claimed that product
life cycle has significantly shortened by rapid technological ad-
vancement, and coupled with fashionable design that attracts fre-
quent purchases of new products, has generated pressure on and
opportunities for reverse logistics. Franke et al. [13] suggested that
remanufacturing of durable high-value products such as automo-
bile engine, aircraft equipment, and machine tools, has been ex-
tended to a large number of consumer goods with short life cy-
cle and relatively low values, like mobile phones and computers.
He also quoted market studies by Marcussen [14] and Directive
2002/96/EC which revealed that there is a significant potential for
mobile phone remanufacturing due to the large supply market of
the used mobile phones in Europe and the high market demand in
Asia and Latin America.
Neto and Bloemhof-Ruwaard [15] found that remanufacturing
significantly reduces the amount of energy used in the product life
cycle, even though the effectiveness of remanufacturing is very
sensitive to the life span of the second life of the product. They
also proposed that the period of the life cycle in which the product
is returned to recovery, the quality of the product (high-end ver-
sus low-end), the easiness to remanufacture and the recovery costscan affect whether or not remanufacturing is more eco-efficient
than manufacturing. Rathore et al. [16] studied the case of reman-
ufacturing mobile handsets in India. They found that used phone
market is very important, even though with a lack of government
regulation for e-wastes. It is also observed that there is a negative
user-perception of second hand goods and that the process of re-
manufacturing has not been able to capture much required atten-
tion from its stakeholders.Wang et al. [17] showed that themobile
phone market in China is growing rapidly. The number of mobile
accounts was 565.22 million in February 2008 according to a re-
port fromMinistry of Information Industry of the People’s Republic
of China. The above mentioned studies have affirmed our intuitive
proposition that there is a high potential for remanufacturing short
life cycle products.
Motives for deploying reverse chain can be for profitability
(or cost minimization) or for sustainability (environmental impact
mitigation), which either could be driven by regulation and/ or
morale. In our research, the underlying motive considered would
be focused on profitability, which seems to be the suitable mo-
tive applied to industries in a situation with the absence of en-
vironment protection regulation, like in most of the developing
countries. There are numerous studies that investigated the factors
that influence decision to remanufacture as well as the factors for
successful remanufacturing. We categorized the factors into four
aspects, namely product characteristics, demand-related factors,
process-related factors, and supply-related factors.
The first aspect, product characteristics of short life cycle prod-
ucts, consist of (1) innovation rate (fast vs. slow) as an extension
to technology factor [8,18–20]; (2) residence time [21]; (3) prod-
uct residual value [22]; (4) qualitative obsolesce, as an extension
to product characteristics [3,23].
Second, demand-related factors, consist of (1) market size or
existence of the demand, [18,19,24]; (2) market channel, which
is about selling remanufactured products using the same channel
as the new product, or differentiated [8,18–21,25–27]; (3) pricing
of new and remanufactured products, with demand as a function
of price [28,32,33,30,18,19,26]; (4) existence of green segment,
[23,31].
Supply-related factors can be described by (1) acquisition price
and (2) source of return, whether it is limited and then pose as a
constraint, or unlimited. These factors were studied in [8,18,19,23,
24,32].
The last factors, which are process-related, consist of (1) reman-
ufacturing technology availability [8,18,32]; (2) remanufacturing
cost, [8,18,19,21,22,32]; (3) reverse flow structure readiness [8,20,
24,32–34].
There are several studies that discuss pricing strategies in-
volving remanufactured products, obsolescence, and nonlinear de-
mand function. However, none has considered the situation that
we address in this paper. Table 1 shows the review result and
where our proposed model stands.
3. Problem description
A closed-loop supply chain consists of three members, which
are manufacturer, retailer, and collector, as depicted in Fig. 1. The
closed-loop is initiated by production of new product, which is
sold at a wholesale price Pnw to the retailer. The new product is
then released to the market at a retail price Pn1 for the period
when product life-cycle is within introduction–growth–maturity
(IMG) phases, or during increasing and stable phases. When the
new product has reached its decline phase, retailer starts to apply
different pricing, Pn2. In the model development, the price is dif-
ferentiated between IMG phases and decline phase to study the
impact of this differentiated pricing, as Kotler & Armstrong [52]
suggest that reduced price during decline phase could increase the
quantity of demanded goods. An example of short life-cycle prod-
uctwhere the newproduct reaches its decline phase in a short time
is, Samsung Galaxy Tab 10.1 that was released on second quarter
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Literatures on pricing models.
Supply Chain
members
involved
Differentiating
New & Reman
Planning
Horizon
Demand
function
Decision
variables
Objective Consi-
dering
obsoles-
cence
Remark
Guide et al. (2003) [35] Remanufacturer Only reman
product
Single period Dr known Price of
*Reman
*Core
Max profit No Consider several
quality classes of
cores
Bakal and Akcali (2006)
[36]
Remanu-facturer Only reman
product
Single period Linear in
price
Price of
*Reman
*Core
Max profit No Consider effect of
recovery yield
Ferrer and
Swaminathan
(2006) [37]
Manufacturer No (Pn= Pr) *Infinite
*Two period
*Multi period
Linear in
price
*Price
*Quantity
Max profit No Consider
monopoly &
duopoly
Vadde et al. (2006) [38] Product recovery
facility
Only reman
product
Selling horizon Function of
price and
obsolescence
*Price Max profit Yes Consider 2 types
of obsolescence
*Gradual
*Sudden
Mitra (2007) [39] Retailer Reman &
refurbish
products
Selling horizon Two cases:
*Linear in
price
*Non-linear
Price of
*Reman
*Refurbish
Max
revenue
No Consider the
availability of
product
Atasu et al. (2008) [31] Manufacturer Yes (Pn ≠ Pr) Two period Linear in
price
*Price
*Quantity
Max profit No Consider green
segment, market
diffusion,
competition with
other OEM
Qiaolun et al.
(2008) [29]
*Manufacturer
*Retailer
*Collector
No
(Pn= Pr)
Selling horizon Linear in
price
Price of
*Retail
*Wholesale
*Collecting
Max profit No Manufacturer is
the Stackelberg
leader
Li et al. (2009) [40] Remanufacturer Only reman
product
Single period Stochastic,
function of
price
Price of
*Reman
*Core
Max
utilization
No Consider random
yield and random
demand
Liang et al. (2009) [41] Remanufacturer Only reman
product
Single period None Price of core High
return on
investment
No Consider selling
price follows
GMB, and core
price follows
option principles
Ferrer & Swaminathan
(2010) [42]
Manufacturer Yes
(Pn ≠ Pr)
*Infinite
*Two period
*Multi period
Linear in
price
*Price
*Quantity
Max profit No Consider
monopoly &
duopoly
Ovchinnikov
(2011) [28]
Manufacturer Yes
(Pn ≠ Pr)
Pn fixed
Selling horizon Dn known &
constant
Dr function
of price
*Price
*Quantity of
reman
Max profit No Also study
customers’
switching
behavior
α (Pr) ∈ [0, 1]
Shi et al. (2011) [43] Manufacturer No
(Pn= Pr)
Single period Stochastic,
linear in
price
*Price
*Quantity of
new &
reman
Max profit No Consider
understocking &
overstocking risks
Vadde et al. (2011) [44] Product recovery
facility
No new
products
Single period Deterministic Prices Max
revenue
Min cost
No Consider several
types of used
products
Wei & Zhao (2011) [45] *Manufacturer
*Retailer
No
(Pn= Pr)
Single period Linear in
price
Price of
*Retail
*Wholesale
*Collecting
Max profit No Consider two
competing
retailers
Pokharel & Liang
(2012) [46]
Consolidation
center
Only cores Single period Dr is known *Core price
*Quantity of
cores
Min cost No Consider
stochastic return
quantity and
quality
Wu (2012a) [47] *OEM
*Remanufacturer
Yes
(Pn ≠ Pr)
Two period Linear in
price
Prices
*New
*Reman
Max profit No Consider level of
interchangeability
(continued on next page)
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Supply Chain
members
involved
Differentiating
New & Reman
Planning
Horizon
Demand
function
Decision
variables
Objective Consi-
dering
obsoles-
cence
Remark
Wu (2012b) [48] *OEM
*Remanufacturer
Yes
(Pn ≠ Pr)
*Two period
*Multi period
Linear in
price
Prices
*New
*Reman
Max profit No Consider degree
of
disassemblability
Chen & Chang
(2013) [49]
Manufacturer Yes
(Pn ≠ Pr)
*Static
*2-period
*Multi periods
over life-cycle
*Linear in
price, with
substi-
tutable
coefficient
*Dynamic
(over time)
Price of
*New
*Reman
for each
period
Max profit No *Static
unconstrained
*Dynamic pricing
- constrained
*Consider system
of manufacturing
only & hybrid
settings
Jena & Sarmah
(2013) [50]
*Remanufacturer
*Retailer
Only reman
product
Single period Random Cores price Max profit No Consider 3
schemes of
collection: direct,
indirect,
coordinated
Xiong et al. (2013) [51] Manufacturer Only reman
product
Finite & infinite
horizon
Random Cores price Min cost No Consider lost
sales and
uncertain quality
of used products
Proposed model *Manufacturer
*Retailer
*Collector
Yes
(Pn≠Pr)
Selling horizon Function of
time and
price
Price of
*Retail
*Wholesale
*Collecting
Max profit Yes Consider the
impact of speed of
change in demand
Note: Pn= price of new product, Pr= price of remanufactured product,
Dn= demand of new product, Dr= demand of remanufactured product.Fig. 1. Framework of the closed-loop pricing model.
2011. According to trial documents of Apple Inc. vs. Samsung Elec-
tronics Co., Ltd [53], the sales of that product is entering decline
phase starting on first quarter 2012.
After a certain period of time, someproducts reach their end-of-
use and become the objects of used products collection. The used
product would be acquired by collector under certain acquisition
prices, Pc1 and Pc2, for product originated from IMG phases and de-
cline phase, respectively. The collected product is then transferred
to manufacturer at price Pf , as the input for remanufacturing pro-
cess. The remanufactured product is sold to retailer at wholesale
price Prw and released to the market at retail price Pr .
The product considered in this model is single item, short life-
cycle, with obsolescence effect after a certain period. Demand
functions are time-dependent functions which represent the short
life-cycle pattern along the entire phases of product life-cycle, both
for new and remanufactured products; and linear in price.
There are four periods considered in this model, as depicted in
Fig. 2. In the first period [0, t1], only new product is offered to the
market, while in second [t1, µ] and third period [µ, t3] both new
and remanufactured products are offered. The difference between
second and third period is on the segments of life-cycle phases
for both types. During second period, both new and remanufac-
tured products are at the IMG phases. In the third period, the new
product has entered the decline phasewhile remanufactured prod-
uct has not. In the fourth period [t3, T ], manufacturer has stopped
producing new product and only offers remanufactured product
which is assumed to be on the decline phase.
The market demand capacity is adopted from Wang and
Tung [54] and extended to cover the obsolescence period, whereFig. 2. Demand pattern of a product with gradual obsolescence, over time.
demand decreases significantly. The demand patterns are con-
structed for both new and remanufactured product and the gov-
erning functions are formulated as follows:
Dn(t) =

Dn1(t) = U/

1+ ke−λUt ; 0 ≤ t ≤ µ
Dn2(t) = U/ (λU(t − µ)+ δ) ; µ ≤ t ≤ t3
where
k = U/D0 − 1
δ = 1+ ke−λUµ (3.1)
Dr(t) =

Dr1(t) = V/

1+ he−ηV (t−t1) ; t1 ≤ t ≤ t3
Dr2(t) = V/ (ηV (t − t3)+ ε) ; t3 ≤ t ≤ T
where
h = V/Dr0 − 1
ε = 1+ he−ηV (t3−t1) (3.2)
where Dn(t) and Dr(t) are demand pattern for new and remanu-
factured products, respectively, as seen in Fig. 2. U is a parameter
representing the maximum possible demand for new product, µ
is the time when the demand reaches its peak, i.e. at U level. D0 is
the demand at the beginning of the life-cycle (when t = 0), and
λ is the speed of change in the demand as a function of time. A
parallel definition is applicable for V , t3, Dr 0, and η respectively for
the remanufactured products. It is obvious that Dn(t) and Dr(t) are
continuous at µ and t3, respectively, as shown in Appendix A.
The new products are sold at retail price Pn1 during [0, µ], and
Pn2 during [µ, t3]. Since demand function is also linear in price,
there is a maximum price Pm (known and fixed) as the upper limit,
S.S. Gan et al. / Operations Research Perspectives 2 (2015) 1–12 5Fig. 3. Demand of new product during [0, µ]; (a) time-view (b) price-view.at which demand would be zero. Remanufactured products are
sold at retail price Pr during [t1, T ], and the maximum price is
Pn2, since customer would choose to buy new product rather than
remanufactured one when the remanufactured product price is as
high as Pn2. Therefore,
Demand of new product during
[0, µ] = Dn1(t)(1− Pn1/Pm) (3.3)
Demand of new product during
[µ, t3] = Dn2(t)(1− Pn2/Pm) (3.4)
Demand of reman product during
[t1, t3] = Dr 1(t)(1− Pr/Pn2) (3.5)
Demand of reman product during
[t3, T ] = Dr 2(t)(1− Pr/Pn2). (3.6)
Fig. 3 illustrates the demandof newproduct for the period of [0, µ].
The demand function information is shared to all members of
the supply chain.
Manufacturer decides the wholesale prices for new product
(Pnw) and remanufactured product (Prw), retailer determines the
retail prices (Pn1, Pn2, Pr), while collector determines collecting
prices Pc1 and Pc2 for cores collected from end-of-use product
within the periods of [0, µ] and [µ, t3] respectively. Since the
product has short life-cycle, remanufacturing process is only
applied to cores originated from new products.
Return rate (τ ) is an increasing function of the collecting price.
We use the return rate function proposed by Qiaolun et al. [29],
which was a result of their survey that employs a power function.
The return rate τ is defined on [t1, T ] and depends on Pc as follows
τ = γ Pθc (3.7)
where γ are positive constant coefficients, and θ ∈ [0, 1] are expo-
nents of the power functions, which determine curve’s steepness.
It is assumed that collector only accepts coreswith a certain quality
grade, and all collected cores will be remanufactured.
Since our research is focusing on pricing decision, we do not
make an attempt to show detailed derivation of production and
operational costs, and instead treat those costs as given parame-
ters, which consist of unit rawmaterial cost for new product (crw),
unit manufacturing cost (cm), unit remanufacturing cost (cr), and
unit collecting cost (c). The objective of the proposed model is to
find the optimal prices that maximize profit, and we investigate
two scenarios, (1) maximize profit independently, and (2) maxi-
mize joint profit along the supply chain.
4. Optimization
4.1. Independently optimized profit
4.1.1. Retailer’s optimization
In this scenario,manufacturermakes the firstmove by releasing
initial wholesale prices (Pnw, Prw). Retailer then optimizes theretail prices Pn1, Pn2, and Pr . The profit function can be formulated
as follows:
ΠR =
 µ
0
U
1+ ke−λUt

1− Pn1
Pm

(Pn1 − Pnw) dt
+
 t3
µ
U
λU(t − µ)+ δ

1− Pn2
Pm

(Pn2 − Pnw) dt
+
 t3
t1
V
1+ he−ηV (t−t1)

1− Pr
Pn2

(Pr − Prw) dt
+
 T
t3
V
µV (t − t3)+ ε

1− Pr
Pn2

(Pr − Prw) dt
= d1

1− Pn1
Pm

(Pn1 − Pnw)+ d2

1− Pn2
Pm

(Pn2 − Pnw)
+ (d3 + d4)

1− Pr
Pn2

(Pr − Prw) (4.1)
where
d1 = 1
λ
ln

δ
(1+ k) e−λUµ

d2 = 1
λ
ln

λU(t3 − µ)+ δ
δ

d3 = 1
η
ln

ε
(1+ h)e−ηV (t3−t1)

d4 = 1
η
ln

ηV (T − t3)+ ε
ε

.
The objective function is to maximize profit (4.1), and con-
sequently it needs to satisfy the first derivative conditions
∂ΠR/∂Pn1 = 0, ∂ΠR/∂Pn2 = 0, and ∂ΠR/∂Pr = 0. The profit
function (4.1) is not always concave along the considered interval,
because Pn2 took a hyperbolic form as a result of being the upper
bound of Pr , so we need to establish the interval on which profit
function is concave.
Property 1. The objective function (1) is concave when
Pn2 ≥ 3

(d3 + d4) PmP2rw
4d2
. (4.2)
Proof. See Appendix B.
The above result implies that the demand of remanufactured
product (d3 and d4) influences the price of new product during the
decline stage. Demand capacity during decline stage which is af-
fected by the length of that period has also contributed in shifting
the interval of the concave function.
The optimal retail prices Pn1*, Pn2*, and Pr* are obtained by
solving equations from first derivatives conditions:
P∗n1 = (Pm + Pnw) /2 (4.3)
P∗r = (Pn2 + Prw) /2 (4.4)
− 2
Pm
d2

P∗n2
3 + d2 1+ PnwPm

+ d3 + d4
4
 
P∗n2
2
− (d3 + d4) (Prw)
2
4
= 0. (4.5)
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It is expected that P∗n2 is lower than P
∗
n1 to increase demand rate at
the decline stage, however the model allows P∗n2 to attain higher
value than P∗n1, which in turns is not attractive for customers. Our
investigation showed that Pn2 has a tendency to attain higher value
than Pn1, which is also consistent with Ferrer and Swaminathan’s
finding [37]. However, this is not an expected result since higher
price during decline stage is not attractive for customers andmight
not be able to improve the demand rate. Therefore, we set a
common price for new product, Pn1 = Pn2. Retailer’s optimization
model becomes
Max
Pn,Pr
ΠR = (d1 + d2)

1− Pn
Pm

(Pn − Pnw)
+ (d3 + d4)

1− Pr
Pn

(Pr − P rw) . (4.6)
Decision variables:
Pn: price of new product
Pr : price of remanufactured product
Parameters:
Pnw: wholesale price of new product
Prw: wholesale price of remanufactured product
Pm: maximum price for new product
d1: total demand for new product within [0, µ]
d2: total demand for new product within [µ, t3]
d3: total demand for remanufactured product within [t1, t3]
d4: total demand for remanufactured product within [t3, T ]
The existence of optimal prices Pn, Pr is shown in Property 2,
and the condition for obtaining prices that maximize retailer’s
profit (4.6) is given in Property 3. The optimal retail prices are given
in Proposition 1.
Property 2. There exists global extrema for profit maximization
problem (4.6) in {(Pn, Pr)|Pnw ≤ Pn ≤ Pm; Prw ≤ Pr ≤ Pm; Pn ∈
R, Pr ∈ R, }.
Proof. See Appendix C.
Property 3. The objective function (4.6) is concave when
Prw
2
− Pr +

d1 + d2
d3 + d4 ·
P3n
Pm
> 0. (4.7)
Proof. See Appendix D.
Proposition 1. The optimal prices for optimization model (4.6) are
P∗n and P∗r where
−2(d1 + d2)
Pm
P∗3n +

d1 + d2
Pm
(Pm − Pnw)+ d3 + d44

P∗2n
− d3 + d4
4
P2rw = 0 (4.8)
P∗r =
P∗n + Prw
2
. (4.9)
Proof. See Appendix E.
From Proposition 1, we can observe that the optimal prices are
not only determined by wholesale prices given by the manufac-
turer, but also by the demand pattern imposed in d1, d2, d3, and d4,
which confirms the influence of demand patterns to the optimal
retail prices.
4.1.2. Collector’s optimization
After retailer decides the optimal retail prices, collector then
uses the resulting demand rates as the parameters in the profit op-timization model, and the objective function is
Max
Pc
ΠC = γ Pθc (d1 + d2)

1− Pn
Pm
 
Pf − Pc − c

. (4.10)
Decision variables:
Pc : acquisition price for used product
Parameters:
Pn, Pm, d1, d2 as mentioned earlier
Pf : transfer price of remanufacturable core from collector to re-
manufacturer
γ : constant coefficient of the return rate
θ : exponent of the return rate power functions
c: unit collecting cost
Property 4 shows the existence of optimal price Pc for collector’s
profit function (4.10). First derivative condition is applied to obtain
the optimal collecting price as shown in Proposition 2.
Property 4. There exists a global extrema for collector’s profit func-
tion (4.10) in

Pc |0 ≤ Pc ≤ Pf ; Pc ∈ R

.
Proof. See Appendix F.
Proposition 2. The collector’s profit function (4.10) attains its maxi-
mum in

Pc |0 ≤ Pc ≤ Pf ; Pc ∈ R

and the optimal collecting price is
P∗c =
θ

Pf − c

(θ + 1) . (4.11)
Proof. See Appendix G.
We assume balanced quantity throughout the supply chain,
which is supported by Guide’s work [26]. Collector should only col-
lect as much as the demand of the remanufactured product, which
consequently determines transfer price.
Proposition 3. The optimal transfer price is
P∗f = c +
θ + 1
θ

(d3 + d4) (1− Pr/Pn)
γ (d1 + d2) (1− Pn/Pm)
 1
θ
. (4.12)
Proof. See Appendix H.
4.1.3. Manufacturer’s optimization
After observing retailer’s and collector’s prices, manufacturer
determines the wholesale prices for both new (Pnw) and reman-
ufactured products (Prw) in order to maximize her profit which is
expressed in the following objective function:
Max
Pnw ,Prw
ΠM = (d1 + d2)

1− Pn
Pm

(Pnw − crw − cm)
+ (d3 + d4)

1− Pr
Pn

×

Prw − cr − c − θ + 1
θ

(d3 + d4) (1− Pr/Pn)
γ (d1 + d2) (1− Pn/Pm)
 1
θ

(4.13)
subject to the optimal prices of the retailer and collector. We apply
Lagrange multipliers method, where we define Lagrangian func-
tion associated with (4.13) as given in (4.14)
L

Pnw, Prw , Pn , P r , ξ , ψ

= ΠM + ξ
−2(d1 + d2)
Pm
P3n
+

d1 + d2
Pm
(Pm − Pnw)+ d3 + d44

P2n −
d3 + d4
4
P2rw

+ψ(2P r − Pn − Prw) (4.14)
where ξψ are the multipliers.
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Pnw: wholesale price of new product
Prw: wholesale price of remanufactured product
Parameters:
Pn, Pr , Pm, d1, d2, d3, d4, Pf , c, γ , θ as mentioned earlier
crw: unit raw material cost for producing new product
cm: unit manufacturing cost for producing new product
cr : unit remanufacturing cost for producing remanufactured
product
The first order conditions of the Lagrangian are regarded as the
necessary conditions for the constrained optimization, and yield a
nonlinear system.We treat Pn and Pr as intermediary decision vari-
ables in this optimization problem since Pn and Pr from retailer’s
optimum pricing decisions are not expressed as explicit functions
in Pnw and Prw , hence the relations are expressed in the constraint
functions.
Following Lagrange multiplier theorem [54], if there exist opti-
mal wholesale prices P∗nw , P∗rw , P∗n , P∗r , then they are the solutions
of first order conditions for (4.14), which are ∂ΠM
∂Pn
= 0, ∂ΠM
∂Pr
= 0,
∂ΠM
∂Pnw
= 0, ∂ΠM
∂Prw
= 0, ∂ΠM
∂ξ
= 0, and ∂ΠM
∂ψ
= 0, that yields (4.15) to
(4.20) respectively.
1
Pm
(d1 + d2) (Pnw − crw − cm)− (d3 + d4)

1− Pr
Pn

× (Prw − cr − c)+

d3 + d4
γ (d1 + d2) (1− Pn/Pm)
1/θ
×
 (θ + 1) (d3 + d4)

1− PrPn
1/θ−1
P2n θ2 (1− Pn/Pm)

×

(θ − 1)

1− Pr
Pn

Pr − (θ − 3)
× PnP r
Pm
+ θP r
Pm
− P
2
n + 2Pr 2
Pm

+ 6P2n ξ
d1 + d2
Pm
− 2Pnξ

d1 + d2
Pm
(Pm − Pnw)+ d3 + d44

−ψ = 0 (4.15)
d3 + d4
Pn

Prw − cr − c − θ + 1
θ

(d3 + d4) (1− Pr/Pn)
γ (d1 + d2) (1− Pn/Pm)
 1
θ
+ (d3 + d4)

1− Pr
Pn

θ + 1
θ2

×

(d3 + d4) (1− Pr/Pn)
γ (d1 + d2) (1− Pn/Pm)
 1
θ
−1
− 2ψ = 0 (4.16)
Pm − Pn − ξP2n = 0 (4.17)
1− Pn
Pm

− ξPrw
2
− ψ = 0 (4.18)
−2(d1 + d2)
Pm
P3n +

d1 + d2
Pm
(Pm − Pnw)+ d3 + d44

P2n
− d3 + d4
4
P2rw = 0 (4.19)
2P r − Pn − Prw = 0. (4.20)
The second order conditions for the Lagrangian function, which re-
flects the sufficient condition for a maxima, are not practical to be
expressed analytically. Therefore, to ensure that the solution is a
maxima we apply a numerical procedure to check the values ofthe function in a close neighborhood of the solution and maximize
profit numerically under an optimization search procedure.
4.2. Joint profit optimization
Under the joint profit scenario, all parties aim atmaximum total
profit along the supply chain. The joint profit function is summa-
tion of retailer’s profit, collector’s profit, andmanufacturer’s profit.
Balanced quantity is also imposed in this model, and for remanu-
factured product, the quantity of demand is equal to the quantity
of returns, which also means collector only collects as much as the
demand for remanufactured products. The optimization problem
is given by the following expressions:
MaxΠJ = ΠR +ΠC +ΠM
= (d1 + d2)

1− Pn
Pm

(Pn − Pnw)
+ (d3 + d4)

1− Pr
Pn

(Pr − Prw)
+ γ Pθc (d1 + d2)

1− Pn
Pm
 
Pf − Pc − c

+ (d1 + d2)

1− Pn
Pm

(Pnw − crw − cm)+ (d3 + d4)
×

1− Pr
Pn
 
Prw − Pf − cr

(4.21)
s.t. (d3 + d4)

1− Pr
Pn

= γ Pθc (d1 + d2)

1− Pn
Pm
.

(4.22)
The joint profit function is then simplified to a function of Pn,
Pr , and Pc as presented in Eq. (4.22). Considering balanced quantity
throughout the supply chain, then the optimizationmodel for joint
profit function becomes (4.23)
ΠJ = (d1 + d2)

1− Pn
Pm

(Pn − crw − cm)+ (d3 + d4)
×

1− Pr
Pn

(Pr − cr − Pc − c) (4.23)
ΠJ = (d1 + d2)

1− Pn
Pm

(Pn − crw − cm)
+ (d3 + d4)

1− Pr
Pn

(Pr − cr − c)−

(d3 + d4)
×

1− Pr
Pn
 θ+1
θ

γ (d1 + d2)

1− Pn
Pm
− 1
θ
. (4.24)
In finding the optimal prices, we assign first derivatives to zero
∂ΠJ
∂Pn
= (d1 + d2)

Pm − 2Pn + crw + cm
Pm

+ (d3 + d4)

Pr − cr − c
P2n

−

(d3 + d4)

1− Pr
Pn
 θ+1
θ
×

γ (d1 + d2)

1− Pn
Pm
− 1
θ
×

θ + 1
θPn (Pn − Pr) −
1
θ (Pm − Pn)

= 0 (4.25)
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8)
9)
0)(d1 + d2)

1− P∗∗nPm

(Pnw − crw − cm)+ (d3 + d4)

1− P∗∗rP∗∗n
 
Prw − Pf − cr
−ΠR
ΠR
= δ
ΠR +ΠM +ΠC (4.2
γ

P∗∗c
θ 1− P∗∗nPm  Pf − P∗∗c − c−ΠC
ΠC
= δ
ΠR +ΠM +ΠC (4.2
(d1 + d2)

1− P∗∗nPm
 
P∗∗n − Pnw
+ (d3 + d4) 1− P∗∗rP∗∗n  P∗∗r − Prw−ΠM
ΠM
= δ
ΠR +ΠM +ΠC (4.3
Box I.∂ΠJ
∂P r
= − 1
Pn
(d3 + d4)
×
Pr − cr − c − θ + 1
θ
 (d3 + d4)

1− PrPn

γ (d1 + d2)

1− PnPm

1/θ

+ (d3 + d4)

1− Pr
Pn

= 0 or
Pn − 2P r + cr + c +

θ + 1
θ
 (d3 + d4)

1− PrPn

γ (d1 + d2)

1− PnPm

1/θ
= 0. (4.26)
The optimal values of P∗∗n and P∗∗r that maximize joint profit are
obtained by solving Eqs. (4.24) and (4.25). Since we assume bal-
anced quantity (consistent with Guide’s work [26]), the optimiza-
tion model is reduced to a problem with two decision variables,
Pn and Pr . These results only determine optimal retail prices, and
leave the wholesale prices (Pnw and Prw) and transfer price (Pf )
to be determined under coordinated decision policy, which incor-
porate equal relative profit difference between independent and
joint profit scenario between manufacturer and retailer. The inte-
grated scenario accommodates coordinated pricing policy that en-
sures higher (or might be lower) profit for each party, and makes
this approach interesting for all members of the supply chain. The
equal relative profit difference can be expressed as follows:
∆ΠR
ΠR
= ∆ΠM
ΠM
= ∆ΠC
ΠC
(4.27)
where∆ΠR = ΠR,J−ΠR;∆ΠM = ΠM,J−ΠM ;∆ΠC = ΠC,J−ΠC .
Therefore, we get Eqs. (4.28)–(4.30) (see Box I) where δ =
ΠJ − (ΠR +ΠM +ΠC ) = ∆ΠR +∆ΠM +∆ΠC .
This system of Eqs. (4.28)–(4.30) is solved for Pnw, Prw , and Pf
to obtain the wholesale prices and transfer price under joint profit
scenario.
5. Numerical example and discussions
In this numerical example, the parameters in demand function
are using data from numerical example in [54], because it repre-
sents demand pattern of product with gradual obsolescence. How-
ever, that study does not consider used product’s return, therefore
parameters in return function is taken from numerical example
in [29]. As for the cost parameters, we developed the data based on
case studies in a report for Ellen MacArthur Foundation, Towards
The Circular Economy [55].
New product’s demand capacity parameters are U = 1000,
D0 = 90, λ = [0.01, 0.05, 0.1, 0.2], and remanufactured prod-
uct’s demand capacity parameters are V = 500, Dr 0 = 50, η =[0.01, 0.05, 0.1, 0.2]. Selling horizon is divided into four time pe-
riods where t1 = 1, µ = 2, t3 = 3, and T = 4. The unit raw
material cost for new product crw = 1500, unit manufacturingcost cm = 1000, unit remanufacturing cost cr = 800, and unit
collecting cost c = 100. Maximum price is Pm = 12 000. Return
rate parameters are γ = 0.01, and θ = 0.7. The decision variables
are Pn, Pr , Pnw, Prw, Pc, Pf , which represent price of new product,
price of remanufactured product, wholesale price of new product,
wholesale price of remanufactured product, collection price and
transfer price, respectively. Table 2 presents the results.
From the results above,wehave shown that joint profit scenario
gives a higher total profit rather than optimized individually. It is
also interesting to note that the joint profit model accommodates
coordinated pricing policy that ensures higher profit for each party,
andmaking this approach interesting for allmembers of the supply
chain. Demand rate in the joint profit scenario is much higher
than in the independent one, even though it came from the same
demand parameters. In the independent model, with the lack
of integrated decision among the three players, the retail prices
were set substantially higher than the true optimums. We also
observed that Collector profit is much lower than Retailer’s and
Manufacturer’s, because Collector only gains from remanufactured
product. This result is consistent with Qiaolun’s [29].
The optimization models also show that transfer price can be
found by balancing the return rate with the demand of remanu-
factured product. Under this approach we can determine trans-
fer price that could benefit both manufacturer and collector, and
it puts collector at better position rather than the presumed con-
dition that transfer price is negotiated between manufacturer and
collector. Since manufacturer is the Stackelberg leader, it is pos-
sible that collector would have been in lower bargaining position.
Even though this approach might not be interested for the manu-
facturer, as it puts limitation to manufacturer’s power, but it actu-
ally creates sustainability for the overall closed-loop supply chain.
The betterment in collector’s position would be a good motivation
to continue collecting used products for remanufacturing, and sup-
port environment protection.
Different speeds of change in the demand of new and reman-
ufactured product obviously result in different pricing decisions.
However, faster penetration to the market, which is shown by
the higher speed of change in demands, does not simply generate
higher total profits. It can be seen from the demand function and
optimizationmodels that speed of change in demandwill influence
the sales volumes in each period and subsequently has impacted
the optimum pricing decision. As stated in Propositions 1 and 3,
the optimal prices depend on the demand volumes in respective
periods. We can also find an interval of speed of change in demand
where the total profit reaches its highest value. This could lead to a
marketing decision where the players should control market pen-
etration such that the speed of change is within the desirable in-
terval.
The impact of demand’s speed of change to the optimal prices
In this paper, demand of short life-cycle product is time-
dependent and demand pattern over time is influenced by several
parameters, such as speed of change in demand as shown in (3.1)
and (3.2). The speed of n change in the demands is determined
by parameter λ and η, for new and remanufactured product,
respectively. The higher λ and η, the faster demand increases
S.S. Gan et al. / Operations Research Perspectives 2 (2015) 1–12 9Table 2
Comparison between independent and joint profit scenarios.
λ, η
0.01 0.05 0.10 0.20
Independent scenario
Pn 9,889.78 9,896.80 9,896.98 9,896.86
Pr 8,318.83 8,346.32 8,347.02 8,346.56
Pnw 7,018.45 6,997.86 6,997.33 6,997.68
Prw 6,747.80 6,795.85 6,797.06 6,796.26
Pc 422.04 468.28 469.50 468.70
Pf 1,124.96 1,237.25 1,240.21 1,238.27
ΠM 2,391,233.07 2,453,199.12 2,443,651.42 2,434,076.99
ΠR 1,246,142.45 1,279,206.64 1,274,245.91 1,269,241.66
ΠC 145,869.03 176,221.10 176,253.30 175,094.89
Total profit 3,783,244.55 3,908,626.86 3,894,150.63 3,878,413.54
Joint profit scenario
Pn 7,816.53 7,837.87 7,838.40 7,838.06
Pr 4,720.08 4,758.91 4,759.89 4,759.25
Pnw 5,756.12 6,110.48 6,115.01 6,579.60
Prw 4,133.21 3,566.64 3,560.95 2,742.55
Pc 297.96 321.15 321.74 321.36
Pf 913.79 1,004.01 1,006.38 1,004.83
ΠM,J 3,178,657.26 3,248,364.50 3,235,368.72 3,222,922.56
ΠR,J 1,656,492.54 1,693,841.07 1,687,088.16 1,680,582.67
ΠC,J 193,903.16 233,340.36 233,357.51 231,840.36
Total profit 5,029,052.96 5,175,545.93 5,155,814.39 5,135,345.59Table 3
Optimal prices under various speeds of change in demand.
λ, η Pn Pr Pnw Prw ΠM ΠR ΠC
0.01 9890 8319 7018 6748 1,246,142.45 2,391,233.07 145,869.03
0.05 9897 8346 6998 6796 1,279,206.64 2,453,199.12 176,221.10
0.1 9897 8347 6997 6797 1,274,245.91 2,443,651.42 176,253.30
0.2 9897 8347 6998 6796 1,269,241.66 2,434,076.99 175,094.89
0.3 9897 8346 6998 6796 1,266,865.91 2,429,539.87 174,376.30during IMG phases, and decreases during decline phase. Therefore,
the accumulation of demand over time would influence the
optimal prices, since we consider the whole product life cycle. We
vary λ and η to study their impacts on decision variables and the
objective functions. Table 3 and Fig. 4 show the results.
As shown in Fig. 4, optimal prices are sensitive to parameters
that reflect the speed of change in demand for lower market
penetration, but they are robust for higher speed of change in
demand. This can be explained by the specific nature of demand
pattern. For a short life cycle productwith demand pattern as given
in (3.1) and (3.2), higher speed of change in demand leads to a
condition that is closer to constant demand. Therefore, optimal
prices do not change significantly compared to the ones with
lower speed of change in demand. This situation is applicable
to a product with demand pattern such that in the beginning of
product’s introduction phase, the increase in demand tends to be
very steep, such as launching a new model of smartphone. After a
certain time period, the demand decreases quite rapidly. We argue
that the optimal prices are more robust in higher speed, because
the effect of speed of change becomes less significant. This means,
when speed of change in demand is high such that the sales reach
maximum demand in a very short time, then the price setting does
not need to be adjusted when there is a small change in the speed.
However,when the speed is low, the sales climbup rather slowly to
reach maximum demand, so it is important to adjust price setting
when there is a change in the speed, to avoid sub-optimal prices.
The managerial insight for this matter can be explained as fol-
lows. Under lower speed of change in demand, decision makers
need to carefully update the prices to avoid sub-optimality. But
when it moves fast to the peak, price updates become less urgent,
since the demand has reached its uniform pattern.6. Conclusion and future research agenda
In this study we have developed pricing decision models for
remanufacturing of short life-cycle product. The study fills the
gap of remanufacturing literature which to date has been mostly
dominated by durable products. For some short life cycle products,
remanufacturing is a sensible activity to do, but the speed of
collecting and remanufacturing the used products should be quick
as the demand for the product is diminishing fast. Here are some
conclusions that we obtain from this study:
• Reducing the price of new products during the decline phase
does not give better profit for the whole system,
• The total profit obtained from optimizing each player indepen-
dently is lower than the total profit of the integrated model
where we optimize the joint profit for three members in the
supply chain, namelymanufacturer, retailer and collector. None
of the player is worse off by moving from the independent
model to the joint profit model, under coordinated pricing
policy,
• The total demand is significantly higher under the integrated
model. This is understandable because the retail prices are
lower for both the new and remanufactured products. The lack
of coordination in making the pricing decision has led the inde-
pendent models to set high retail prices and hence the demand
potential is not well exploited,
• Faster penetration to the market, which is shown by the higher
speed of change in demands, does not simply generate higher
total profits. There exists an interval of speed of change in de-
mandwhere the total profit reaches its highest value. This could
be a support for marketing decision by controlling market pen-
etration such that the speed of change is within the desirable
interval,
10 S.S. Gan et al. / Operations Research Perspectives 2 (2015) 1–12Fig. 4. Optimal prices charts under various speeds of change in demand.• When demand penetration is low, small changes in the demand
rate affect price settings substantially. However, when demand
penetration is high, price decision is robust against the change
in demand rate.
Future researchmaybedirected towarddevelopment ofmodels
that consider different demand processes, multiple objective func-
tions, and the case when balanced quantity is not the case. It may
be possible that the collector is not able to collect at the quantity
desired by the manufacturer. It is also possible that the manufac-
turer has a certain capacity constraint where not all demand can
be satisfied. In such as case it is important to take into account the
service level.
Appendix A. Dn(t) and Dr(t) are continuous at µ and t3,
respectively
Dn1(µ) = U1+ ke−λUµ
Dn2(µ) = U
(λU(µ− µ)+ δ) =
U
δ
= U
1+ ke−λUµ

×Dn1(µ) = Dn2(µ)
lim
t→µ−
Dn(t) = lim
t→µ−
U
1+ ke−λUt =
U
1+ ke−λUµ
lim
t→µ+
Dn(t) = lim
t→µ+
U
(λU(t − µ)+ δ) =
U
1+ ke−λUµ

× lim
t→µ−
Dn(t) = lim
t→µ+
Dn(t).
Therefore Dn(µ) = limt→µ Dn(µ) = U1+ke−λUµ → Dn(t) is
continuous at t = µ.Similarly,
Dr1(t3) = V1+ he−ηV (t3−t1)
Dr2(t3) = V
(ηV (t3 − t3)+ ε) =
V
ε
= V
1+ he−ηV (t3−t1)

×Dr1(t3) = Dr2(t3)
lim
t→t−3
Dr(t) = lim
t→t−3
V
1+ he−ηV (t−t1) =
V
1+ he−ηV (t3−t1i)
lim
t→t+3
Dr(t) = lim
t→t+3
V
(ηV (t − t3)+ ε) =
V
1+ he−ηV (t3−t1)

× lim
t→t−3
Dr(t) = lim
t→t+3
Dr(t).
Therefore Dr(µ) = limt→t3 Dr(t3) = V1+he−ηV (t3−t1) → Dr(t) is
continuous at t = t3.
Appendix B. Proof of Property 1
ΠR = d1

1− Pn1
Pm

(Pn1 − Pnw)+ d2

1− Pn2
Pm

(Pn2 − Pnw)
+ (d3 + d4)

1− Pr
Pn2

(Pr − Prw)
∂2ΠR
∂P2n1
= −2d1
Pm
< 0
∂2ΠR
∂P2n1
∂2ΠR
∂Pn1∂Pn2
∂2ΠR
∂Pn2∂Pn1
∂2ΠR
∂P2n2

= 2d1
Pm

d2
Pm
+ 2 (d3 + d4) Pr (Pr − Prw)
P2n2

> 0; since Pr ≥ Prw
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
∂2ΠR
∂P2n1
∂2ΠR
∂Pn1∂Pn2
∂2ΠR
∂Pn1∂Pr
∂2ΠR
∂Pn2∂Pn1
∂2ΠR
∂P2n2
∂2ΠR
∂Pn2∂Pr
∂2ΠR
∂Pr∂Pn1
∂2ΠR
∂Pr∂Pn2
∂2ΠR
∂P2nr

= 2d1 (d3 + d4)
PmPn2

(d3 + d4) P2rw
P3n2
− 4d2
Pm

≤ 0
Since |H1| = ∂2ΠR/∂P2n1 < 0; and |H2| = (∂2ΠR/∂P2n1)(∂2ΠR/∂P2n2)−
(∂2ΠR/∂Pn1∂Pn2)2 > 0, then for ΠR to be a concave function,
|H3| = |H| should be less than or equal to zero. Therefore
(d3 + d4) P2rw
P3n2
− 4d2
Pm

≤ 0
or
Pn2 ≥ 3

(d3 + d4) PmP2rw
4d2
.
Appendix C. Proof of Property 2
SinceΠR is a two-variable rational function with a rational pa-
rameter in the coefficients, then it is discontinuous when Pm = 0
and Pn = 0. However, Pm is a nonzero parameter, and Pnw ≤ Pn ≤
Pm with positive Pnw , thereforeΠR is continuous in {(Pn, Pr)|Pnw ≤
Pn ≤ Pm; Prw ≤ Pr ≤ Pm; Pn ∈ R, Pr ∈ R, }. Since ΠR is continu-
ous in a closed interval then it attains global extrema there. 
Appendix D. Proof of Property 3
∂ΠR
∂Pn
= d1 + d2
Pm
(Pm + Pnw − 2Pn)+ d3 + d4P2n

P2r − PrwPr

∂2ΠR
∂P2n
= −2d1 + d2
c
− 2d3 + d4
P3n
Pr (Pr − Prw) < 0
∂ΠR
∂Pr
= d3 + d4
Pn
(−2Pr + Prw + Pn)
∂2ΠR
∂P2r
= −2d3 + d4
Pn
< 0
∂2ΠR
∂Pn∂Pr
= ∂
2ΠR
∂Pr∂Pn
= d3 + d4
P2n
(2Pr − Prw)
D = ∂
2ΠR
∂P2n
·∂
2ΠR
∂P2r
−

∂2ΠR
∂Pn∂Pr
2
= 4 (d1 + d2) (d3 + d4)
PmPn
− (d3 + d4)
2
P4n
(2Pr − Prw)2 > 0
4 (d1 + d2)
Pm
− (d3 + d4)
P3n
(2Pr − Prw)2 > 0
2Pr − Prw <

4
d1 + d2
d3 + d4 ·
P3n
Pm
P rw
2
− P r +

d1 + d2
d3 + d4 ·
P3n
Pm
> 0. 
Appendix E. Proof of Proposition 1
The critical points for (4.6) are obtained by applying first
derivatives condition,∂ΠR
∂Pr
= d3 + d4
Pn
(−2Pr + Prw + Pn) = 0
−2Pr + Prw + Pn = 0→ P∗r =
P∗n + Prw
2
∂ΠR
∂Pn
= d1 + d2
Pm
(Pm + Pnw − 2Pn)+ d3 + d4P2n

P2r − PrwPr
 = 0
−2(d1 + d2)
Pm
P∗3n +
d1 + d2
Pm
(Pm − Pnw) P∗2n
+ (d3 + d4)

P∗n + Prw
2

P∗n + Prw
2
− Prw

= 0
−2(d1 + d2)
Pm
P∗3n +

d1 + d2
Pm
(Pm − Pnw)+ d3 + d44

P∗2n
− d3 + d4
4
P2rw = 0.
From Property 4, the retailer profit function is concave when
condition (4.7) is satisfied, therefore
Prw
2
− Pr +

d1 + d2
d3 + d4 ·
P3n
Pm
> 0
Prw
2
− Pn + Prw
2
+

d1 + d2
d3 + d4 ·
P3n
Pm
> 0
Pn
Pm
< 4
d1 + d2
d3 + d4 . (E.1)
Since PnPm ≤ 1 while d1+d2d3+d4 ≥ 1 then (A6.1) is satisfied. 
Appendix F. Proof of Property 4
The collector’s profit function (4.10) can be written as ΠC =
Φ (Pc) · Ψ (Pc)where
Φ (Pc) = Pθc , θ ∈ [0, 1]
Ψ (Pc) = γ (d1 + d2)

1− Pn
Pm
 
Pf − Pc − c

Φ (Pc) is continuous on the closed interval

Pc |0 ≤ Pc ≤ Pf ; Pc ∈ R

except for Pc = 0 when θ = 0. However, this is a removable dis-
continuity by letting Pθc = 1 at the point of discontinuity, since
limx→0 xx = 1 and Pθc = 1 for Pc ≠ 0, θ = 0.
Ψ (Pc) is continuous on the closed interval

Pc |0 ≤ Pc ≤ Pf ;
Pc ∈ R} since it is a linear function in Pc and Pm ≠ 0.
Therefore ΠC is continuous in a closed interval and attains its
global extrema there. 
Appendix G. Proof of Proposition 2
The critical point for (4.10) is obtained by applying first deriva-
tive condition,
∂ΠC
∂Pc
= γ (d1 + d2)

1− Pn
Pm

Pθ−1c
× θ Pf − c− (θ + 1) Pc = 0
θ

Pf − c
− (θ + 1) Pc = 0
P∗c =
θ

Pf − c

(θ + 1)
∂2ΠC
∂P2c
= γ (d1 + d2)

1− Pn
Pm

(θ − 1) Pθ−2c
× θ Pf − c− (θ + 1) Pc
− (θ + 1) γ (d1 + d2)

1− Pn
Pm

Pθ−1c .
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
Pf − c
− (θ + 1) Pc = 0 at the critical point, then
∂2ΠC
∂P2c
= − (θ + 1) γ (d1 + d2)

1− Pn
Pm

Pθ−1c < 0.
Therefore P∗c is a local maximum point. Following Property 5, we
check the boundary points and compare them with the local max-
imum. Since ΠC (0) = 0, ΠC

Pf

< 0, and ΠC

P∗c

> 0
then P∗c is the global maximum within interval {Pc |0 ≤ Pc ≤
Pf ; Pc ∈ R}. 
Appendix H. Proof of Proposition 3
Balanced quantity for demand of remanufactured product and
acquired used product is satisfied when
(d3 + d4)

1− Pr
Pn

= γ Pθc (d1 + d2)

1− Pn
Pm

.
Since optimal collecting price is given as (4.11), then the respective
transfer price is
(d3 + d4)

1− Pr
Pn

= γ

θ

Pf − c

θ + 1
θ
(d1 + d2)

1− Pn
Pm

and
P∗f = c +
θ + 1
θ

(d3 + d4) (1− Pr/Pn)
γ (d1 + d2) (1− Pn/Pm)
 1
θ
. 
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